We initiate the study of multi-source extractors in the quantum world. In this setting, our goal is to extract random bits from two independent weak random sources, on which two quantum adversaries store a bounded amount of information. Our main result is a two-source extractor secure against quantum adversaries, with parameters closely matching the classical case and tight in several instances. Moreover, the extractor is secure even if the adversaries share entanglement. The construction is the ChorGoldreich [CG88] two-source inner product extractor and its multi-bit variant by Dodis et al. [DEOR04] . Previously, research in this area focused on the construction of seeded extractors secure against quantum adversaries; the multi-source setting poses new challenges, among which is the presence of entanglement that could potentially break the independence of the sources.
Introduction and Results

Definition 1. [Two-source extractor against (entangled) quantum storage (informal)
Depending on the type of adversaries, we will say E is secure against entangled or non-entangled storage. Note again that entanglement between the adversaries is specific to the multi-source scenario and does not arise in the case of seeded extractors.
Having set the framework, we show that the construction of Dodis et al. [DEOR04] is secure, first in the case of non-entangled adversaries. 2 ) + 1 2 (k 1 − b 1 + k 2 − b 2 − n) − 9 log ε −1 − O(1) output bits, provided k 1 + k 2 − max(b 1 , b 2 ) > n + Ω(log 3 (n/ε)).
As we show next the extractor remains secure even in the case of entangled adversaries. Notice the loss of essentially a factor of 2 in the allowed storage; this is related to the fact that superdense coding allows to store n bits using only n/2 entangled qubit pairs. (k 1 − 2b 1 + k 2 − 2b 2 − n) − 9 log ε −1 − O(1) output bits, provided k 1 + k 2 − 2 max(b 1 , b 2 ) > n + Ω(log 3 (n/ε)).
Note that in both cases, when the storage is linear in the source entropy we can output Ω(n) bits with exponentially small error. To compare to the performance of the DEOR-extractor in the classical case, note that a source with min-entropy k and classical storage of size b roughly corresponds to a source of min-entropy k − b (see, e.g., Lem. 3.1). Using this correspondence, the extractor of [DEOR04] gives m = max(k 1 , k 2 ) + k 1 − b 1 + k 2 − b 2 − n − 6 log ε −1 − O(1) output bits against classical storage, whenever k 1 + k 2 − max(b 1 , b 2 ) > n + Ω(log n · (log 2 n + log ε −1 )). Hence the conditions under which we can extract randomness are essentially the same for DEOR and for our Thm. 2. The amount of random bits we can extract is somewhat less than in the classical case, even when disregarding storage.
In the non-entangled case, we are able to generalize our result to the stronger notion of guessing entropy adversaries or so called quantum knowledge (see discussion below and Sec. 5 for details). We show that the DEOR-extractor remains secure even in this case, albeit with slightly weaker parameters.
Theorem 4. The DEOR-construction is a (k 1 , k 2 , ε) extractor against quantum knowledge with m = (1 − o(1)) max(k 1 , k 2 ) + 1 6 (k 1 + k 2 − n) − 9 log ε −1 − O(1) output bits, provided k 1 + k 2 > n + Ω(log 3 (n/ε)).
Strong extractors: The extractor in Thms. 2, 3 and 4 is a so called weak extractor, meaning that when trying to break the extractor, no full access to any of the sources is given (which is natural in the multisource setting). We also obtain several results in the so called strong case (see Cor. 15, Lem. 19, Cor. 29 and Lem. 30). A strong extractor has the additional property that the output remains secure even if the adversaries later gain full access to any one (but obviously not both) of the sources. 3 See Sec. 2 for details and a discussion of the subtleties in defining a strong extractor in the entangled case, and Secs. 3, 4 and 5 for our results in the strong case.
Tightness: In the one-bit output case, we show that our results are tight, both in the entangled and non-entangled setting (see Lem. 17).
Proof ideas and tools:
To show both of our results, we first focus on the simplest case of one-bit outputs. In this case the DEOR extractor [DEOR04] simply computes the inner product E(x, y) = x · y (mod 2) of the n-bit strings x and y coming from the two sources. Assume that the two adversaries are allowed quantum storage of b qubits each. Given their stored information they jointly wish to distinguish E(x, y) from uniform, or, in other words, to predict x · y. We start by observing that this setting corresponds to the well known simultaneous message passing (SMP) model in communication complexity, 4 where two parties, Alice and Bob, have access to an input each (which is unknown to the other). They each send a message of length b to a referee, who, upon reception of both messages, is to compute a function E(x, y) of the two inputs. When E is hard to compute, it is a good extractor. Moreover, the entangled adversaries case corresponds to the case of SMP with entanglement between Alice and Bob, a model that has been studied in recent work (see e.g. [GKRdW09, GKdW06] ).
Before we proceed, let us remark, that there are cases, where entanglement is known to add tremendous power to the SMP model. Namely, Gavinsky et al. [GKRdW09] showed an exponential saving in communication in the entangled SMP model, compared to the non-entangled case. 5 This points to the possibility that some extractors can be secure against a large amount of storage in the non-entangled case, but be insecure against drastically smaller amounts of entangled storage. Our results show that this is not the case for the DEOR extractor, i.e., that this construction is secure against the potentially harmful effects of entanglement.
In the one-bit output DEOR case we can tap into known results on the quantum communication complexity of the inner product problem (IP). Cleve et al. [CvDNT98] and Nayak and Salzman [NS06] have given tight lower bounds in the one-way and two-way communication model, with and without entanglement (which also gives bounds in the SMP model). For instance, in the non-entangled case, to compute IP exactly in the one-way model, n qubits of communication are needed, and in the SMP model, n qubits of communication are needed from Alice and from Bob, just like in the classical case. Note that whereas in the communication setting typically worst case problems are studied, extractors correspond to average case (w.r.t. to weak randomness) problems. With some extra work we can adapt the communication lower bounds to weak sources and to the average bias which is needed for the extractor result. In fact, the results we obtain hold in the strong case (where later one of the sources is completely exposed), which corresponds to one-way communication complexity.
Tightness of our results comes from matching upper bounds on the one-way and SMP model communication complexity of the inner product. Adapting the work of [CG88] we can obtain tight bounds for any bias ε. Somewhat surprisingly, it seems no one has looked at tight upper bounds for IP in the entangled SMP model, where [CvDNT98] give an n/2 lower bound for the message length for Alice and Bob. It turns out this bound is tight, 6 which essentially leads to the factor 2 separation in our results for the entangled vs. non-entangled case (see Sec. 3).
To show our results for the case of multi-bit extractors, we use the nice properties of the DEOR construction (and its precursors [Vaz87, DO03] ). The extractor outputs bits of the form Ax · y. Vazirani's XOR-Lemma allows to reduce the multi-bit to the one-bit case by relating the distance from uniform of the multi-bit extractor to the sum of biases of XOR's of subsets of its bits. Each such XOR, in turn, is just a (linearly transformed) inner product, for which we already know how to bound the bias. Our main technical challenge is to adapt the XOR lemma to the case of quantum side-information (see Sec. 2). This way we obtain first results for multi-bit extractors, which even hold in the case of strong extractors. Following [DEOR04] , we further improve the parameters in the weak extractor setting by combining our strong twosource extractor with a good seeded extractor (in our case with the construction of [DPVR09] ) to extract even more bits. See Sec. 4 for details.
Guessing entropy:
One can weaken the requirement of bounded storage, and instead only place a lower bound on the guessing entropy of the source given the adversary's storage, leading to the more general definition of extractors secure against guessing entropy. Informally, a guessing entropy of at least k means that the adversary's probability of correctly guessing the source is at most 2 −k (or equivalently, that given the adversary's state, the source has essentially min-entropy at least k). Working with guessing entropy has the advantage that we no longer have to worry about two parameters (min-entropy and storage) instead only working with one parameter (guessing entropy), and that the resulting extractors are stronger (assuming all other parameters are the same), see Sec. 5. In the classical world, a guessing entropy of k is more or less equivalent to a source with k min-entropy; in the quantum world, however, things become less trivial. In the case of seeded extractors, this more general model has been successfully introduced and studied in [Ren05, KT08, FS08, DPVR09, TSSR10] , where several constructions secure against bounded guessing entropy were shown. 7 In the case of non-entangled two-source extractors, we can show (based on [KT08] ) that any classical one-bit output two-source extractor remains secure against bounded guessing entropy adversaries, albeit with slightly worse parameters. Moreover, our XOR-Lemma allow us prove security of the DEOR-extractor against guessing entropy adversaries even in the multi-bit case (Thm. 4, see Sec. 5 for the details). 8 In the entangled adversaries case, one natural way to define the model is to require the guessing entropy of each source given the corresponding adversary's storage to be high. This definition, however, is too strong: it is easy to see that no extractor can be secure against such adversaries. This follows from the observation that by sharing a random string r 1 r 2 (which is a special case of shared entanglement) and having the first adversary store r 1 ⊕ x, r 2 and the other store r 1 , r 2 ⊕ y, we keep the guessing entropy of X (resp. Y) relative to the adversary's storage unchanged yet we can recover x and y completely from the combined storage. 6 We thank Ronald de Wolf [dW10] for generously allowing us to adapt his upper bound to our setting. 7 Renner [Ren05] deals with the notion of relative min-entropy, which was shown to be equivalent to guessing entropy [KRS09] . 8 We are grateful to Thomas Vidick for pointing out that our XOR-Lemma allows us to obtain results also in this setting.
Hence we are naturally lead to consider the weaker requirement that the guessing entropy of each source given the combined storage of both adversaries is high. We now observe that already the DEOR one-bit extractor (where the output is simply the inner product) is not secure under this definition, indicating that this definition is still too strong. To see this, consider uniform n-bit sources X, Y, and say Alice stores x ⊕ r, and Bob stores y ⊕ r, where r is a shared random string. Obviously, their joint state does not help in guessing X (or Y), hence the guessing entropy of the sources is still n; but their joint state does give x ⊕ y. If, in addition, Alice also stores the Hamming weight |x| mod 4 and Bob |y| mod 4, the guessing entropy is barely affected, and indeed one can easily show it is n − O(1). However, their information now suffices to compute x · y exactly, since x · y = 1 2 ((|x| + |y| − |x ⊕ y|) mod 4). Hence inner product is insecure in this model even for very high guessing entropies, even though it is secure against a fair amount of bounded storage.
In light of this, it is not clear if and how entangled guessing entropy sources can be incorporated into the model, and hence we only consider bounded storage adversaries in the entangled case.
Related work:
We are the first to consider two-source extractors in the quantum world, especially against entanglement. As mentioned, previous work on seeded extractors against quantum adversaries [RK05, KMR05, Ren05, KT08, Ta-09, DV10, DPVR09, BT10] gives rise to trivial two-source extractors where one of the sources is not touched by the adversaries. However, the only previous work that allows to derive results in the genuine two-source scenario is the work by König and Terhal [KT08] . Using what is implicit in their work, and with some extra effort, it is possible to obtain results in the one-bit output non-entangled two-source scenario (which hold against guessing entropy adversaries, but with worse performance than our results for the inner product extractor), and we give this result in detail in Sec. 5. Moreover, [KT08] show that any classical multi-bit extractor is secure against bounded storage adversaries, albeit with an exponential decay in the error parameter. This easily extends to the non-entangled two-source scenario, to give results in the spirit of Thm. 2. We have worked out the details and comparison to Thm. 2 in App. A. Note, however, that to our knowledge no previous work gives results in the entangled scenario.
Discussion and Open Problems:
We have, for the first time, studied two-source extractors in the quantum world. Previously, only seeded extractors have been studied in the quantum setting. In the two-source scenario a new phenomenon appears: entanglement between the (otherwise independent) sources. We have formalized what we believe the strongest possible notion of quantum adversaries in this setting and shown that one of the best performing extractors, the DEOR-construction, remains secure. We also show that our results are tight in the one-bit output case.
Our results for the multi-bit output DEOR-construction allow to extract slightly less bits compared to what is possible classically. An interesting open quesiotn is whether it is possible to obtain matching parameters in the (non-entangled) quantum case. One might have to refine the analysis and not rely solely on communication complexity lower bounds. Alternatively, our quantum XOR-Lemma currently incurs a penalty exponential in either the length of the output or the length of the storage. Any improvement here also immediately improves all three main theorems. In particular, by removing the penalty entirely, Thm. 2 can be made essentially optimal (with respect to the classical case).
We have shown that inner product based constructions are necessarily insecure in two reasonable models of entangled guessing entropy adversaries (and hence that bounded storage adversaries are the more appropriate model in the entangled case). It should be noted that it is possible that other extractor constructions (not based on inner product) could remain secure in this setting, and this subject warrants further exploration.
As pointed out, it is conceivable that entanglement could break the security of two-source extractors. Evidence for this is provided by the communication complexity separation in the entangled vs. non-entangled SMP-model, given in [GKRdW09] . A fascinating open problem is to turn this relational separation into an extractor that is secure against non-entangled quantum adversaries but completely broken when entanglement is present.
Our work leaves several other open questions. It would be interesting to see if other multi-source extractors remain secure against entangled adversaries, in particular the recent breakthrough construction by Bourgain [Bou05] which works for two sources with min-entropy (1/2 − α)n each for some small constant α, or the construction of Raz [Raz05] , where one source is allowed to have logarithmic min-entropy while the other has min-entropy slightly larger than n/2. Both extractors are based on the inner product and output Ω(n) almost uniform bits.
And lastly, it would be interesting to see other application of secure multi-source extractors in the quantum world. One possible scenario is multi-party computation. Classically, Kalai et al. [KLR09] show that sufficiently strong two-source extractors allow to perform multi-party communication with weak sources when at least two parties are honest. Perhaps similar results hold in the quantum setting.
Structure of the paper: In Sec. 2 we introduce our basic notation and definitions, and describe the DEOR construction. Here we also present one of our tools, the "quantum" XOR-Lemma. Sec. 3 is dedicated to the one-bit output case and the connection to communication complexity and gives our tightness results. In Sec. 4 we deal with the multi-bit output case and prove our main result, Thms. 2 and 3. In Sec. 5 we present our results against non-entangled guessing entropy adversaries (partly based on [KT08] ) and prove Thm. 4. App. A works out the results that can be derived from [KT08] in the case of multi-bit extractors against non-entangled bounded storage.
Preliminaries and Tools
In this section we provide the necessary notation, formalize Def.1, describe the DEOR-extractor and present and prove our quantum XOR-Lemma. For background on quantum information see e.g. [NC00] . 
Notation: Given a classical random variable
The security of the extractor is defined relative to the storage. A note on the definition: A strong extractor is secure even if at the distinguishing stage one of the sources is completely exposed. A superstrong extractor is secure even if, in addition, the matching party's entire state is also given. Without entanglement, the two are equal, as the state can be completely reconstructed from the source. In the communication complexity setting the model of strong extractors corresponds to the SMP model where the referee also gets access to one of the inputs, whereas the model of superstrong extractors corresponds to the one-way model, where one party also has access to its share of the entangled state.
To prove E is an extractor, it suffices to show that it is either X-strong or Y-strong. All our proofs follow this route.
Flat sources: It is well known that any source with min-entropy k is a convex combination of flat sources (i.e., sources that are uniformly distributed over their support) with min-entropy k. In what follows we will therefore only consider such sources in our analysis of extractors, as one can easily verify that
where X = ∑ α i X i and Y = ∑ β j Y j are convex combinations of flat sources.
The DEOR construction:
The following (strong) extractor construction is due to Dodis et al. [DEOR04] . Every output bit is a linearly transformed inner product, namely A i x · y for some full rank matrix A i , where x and y are the n-bit input vectors. Here x · y := ∑ n j=1 x j y j (mod 2). The matrices A i have the additional property that every subset sum is also of full rank. This ensures that any XOR of some bits of the output is itself a linearly transformed inner product.
Lemma 7 ([DEOR04]
). For all n > 0, there exist an efficiently computable set of n × n matrices A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A n over GF(2) such that for any non-empty set S ⊆ [n], A S := ∑ i∈S A i has full rank.
The XOR-Lemma: Vazirani's XOR-Lemma [Vaz87] relates the non-uniformity of a distribution to the non-uniformity of the characters of the distribution, i.e., the XOR of certain bit positions. For the DEORextractor it allows to reduce the multi-bit output case to the binary output case.
This lemma is not immediately applicable in our scenario, as we need to take into account quantum side information. For this, we need a slightly more general XOR-Lemma.
Lemma 10 (Classical-Quantum XOR-Lemma). 9 Let Zρ Z be an arbitrary cq-state, where Z is an m-bit classical random variable and ρ Z is of dimension 2 d . Then
Proof. Following the proof of the classical XOR-Lemma in [Gol95] , we first relate Zρ Z − U m ρ Z 1 to Zρ Z − U m ρ Z 2 , and then view Zρ Z − U m ρ Z in the Hadamard (or Fourier) basis, giving us the desired result. We need the following simple claim.
Claim 11. For any Boolean function
. 9 We thank Thomas Vidick for pointing out that we can also have a bound in terms of m and not only d.
where H is the Hadamard transform. 
Using Claim 11 with f (Z) = S · Z, we get
where the second equality holds since χ S is balanced, and the third since ∑ z σ z = 0. Combining Eqs. (3) and (4) gives the desired result.
Factor M: Restarting from the next-to-last step of (2), using again χ S (z)χ y (z) = χ y+S (z) and the triangle inequality, we obtain
where the last step follows from the observation that the matrices inside the norms are of the form P ⊗ B where P is a permutation matrix. In this case P ⊗ B 1 = dim(P) · B 1 = M · B 1 . As before, combining this with Eq. (4) gives the desired bound.
Communication Complexity and One-Bit Extractors
Average case lower bound for inner product
Cleve et al. [CvDNT98] give a lower bound for the worst case one-way quantum communication complexity of inner product with arbitrary prior entanglement. It is achieved by first reducing the problem of computing the inner product to that of transmitting one input over a quantum channel, and then using an extended Holevo bound. Nayak and Salzman [NS06] obtained an optimal lower bound by replacing Holevo with a more "mission-specific" bound: 
Revisiting Cleve et al.'s reduction, we now show how to adapt it to flat sources, to the average case error and to the linearly transformed inner product. The main challenge is to carefully treat the error terms so as to not cancel out the (small) amplitude of the correct state. For a fixed x, denote the success probability of P by 1 2 + ε x (ε x might be negative). Denote Bob's state after receiving the message as |y |0 |σ x , where σ x is taken to contain Alice's message and Bob's prior entangled qubits as required by the protocol (if present). The rest of the protocol is now performed locally by Bob. We denote this computation P B . After applying P B , Bob's state is of the form α x,y |y |x · y |J x,y + β x,y |y |x · y |K x,y , and by assumption, E y β 2 x,y = 1 2 − ε x . Following the analysis in [CvDNT98] , using clean computation, where the output is produced in a new qubit (the leftmost), gives the state
Lemma 13. Let X, Y be flat sources over n bits with min-entropies k 1 , k 2 , and A, B full rank n by n matrices over GF(2). Let P be a b qubit one-way protocol for (AX) · (BY) with success probability
where
|z + x · y P † B |y |x · y |K x,y . Observe the following properties of M: 1. |M x,y,0 = −|M x,y,1 2. As y ∈ Y varies, the states |M x,y,z are orthonormal. 3. Since P † B does not affect the first n (so called input) qubits, |M x,y,z is orthogonal to states of the form |a |y ′ ⊗ |· for all a ∈ {0, 1}, y ∈ Y, y ′ / ∈ Y. We now use the following steps to transfer X from Alice to Bob: 
(−1) a+x·y |a |y |0 |σ x , and note that the second term is orthogonal to both |v and e. It follows that ψ|ψ 0 = √ 2 k 2 −n+2 ε x . Applying the Hadamard transform in Step 3. does not affect the inner product, and so Bob will measure |1x with probability 2 k 2 −n+2 · ε 2
x . Applying Thm. 12.1 and 12.2 along with Jensen's inequality now completes the proof.
For the general case where A = I or B = I, we modify Step 3. of the transmission protocol. Instead of the Hadamard transform, Bob applies the inverse of the unitary transformation |z |x → √ 2 −n−1 · ∑ y,a (−1) za+(Ax)·(By) |a |y . It is easy to check that this gives the desired result.
One bit extractor
When the extractor's output is binary, distinguishing it from uniform is equivalent to computing the output on average. This was shown by Yao [Yao82] when the storage is classical and is trivially extended to the quantum setting. With this observation, reformulating Lem. 13 in the language of trace distance yields a one bit extractor.
Corollary 14. The function E IP
Proof. With Yao's equivalence, Lem. 13.(a) immediately gives
for any full rank matrix A, and specifically for A = I. By the assumption on ε, E IP is either Y-strong or X-strong. Repeating this argument with Lem. 13.(b) gives the non-entangled case.
Recall (see Def. 6 and discussion thereafter) that one-way communication corresponds to the model of superstrong extractors. It is not surprising then that Lem. 13 actually implies a superstrong extractor. By choosing ε in the above proof of Cor. 14 such that both inequalities (5) and (6) are satisfied, where we replace ρ xY by ρ A xY to include Alice's complete state as well as Bob's entangled qubits and similarly for ρ B Xy , we obtain:
We now show that the parameters of all our extractors are tight up to an additive constant. For simplicity, assume first that the error ε is close to 1/2, the sources are uniform and b 1 = b 2 := b. Cor. 14 then states that E IP is an extractor as long as b < n in the non-entangled case and b < n/2 in the entangled case. Indeed, in the non-entangled case it is trivial to compute the inner product in the SMP model (i.e., break the extractor) when b ≥ n. With entanglement, b ≥ n/2 suffices as demonstrated by the following protocol, adapted from a protocol by de Wolf [dW10] . Denote the Pauli matrices σ 00 = I, σ 01 = Z, σ 10 = X, σ 11 = ZX. Given a shared EPR pair, Alice applies σ x 1 x 2 to her qubit and sends it to the referee, and Bob does the same with σ y 1 y 2 . Note that applying σ b 1 b 2 to the first qubit has the same effect as applying it to the second qubit. Further, X is applied iff b 1 is 1 and Z is applied iff b 2 is 1. Since two applications of X (Z) cancel each other out, we have that X is applied to the first qubit iff x 1 + y 1 = 1 and Z is applied to the first qubit iff x 2 + y 2 = 1. The net effect on the EPR state is σ x 1 x 2 ⊕y 1 y 2 ⊗ I. For each value of x 1 x 2 ⊕ y 1 y 2 this gives one of the orthogonal (completely distinguishable) Bell states.
Showing that our results are tight for arbitrary ε is trickier. We show
Proof. We give a slightly modified version of Proposition 10 in [CG88] , taking into account quantum side information. We need the following theorem.
Theorem 18 ([CG88, Theorem 3]). There exist independent random variables X, Y on l bits with minentropy
We start in the weak extractor setting with entanglement. We construct sources X, Y with min-entropy k 1 , k 2 and (b 1 , b 2 ) entangled quantum storage ρ XY for which the error will be "large". Let b = 2(min(b 1 , b 2 ) − 2), and let ∆ = k 1 + k 2 − n. If ∆ ≤ b, we pick X to be uniform on the first k 1 bits and 0 elsewhere, Y uniform on the last k 2 bits and 0 elsewhere. The inner product of X, Y is then the inner product of at most b bits, and can be computed exactly using the SMP protocol in Claim 16 with min(b 1 , b 2 ) qubits from each.
In the case ∆ > b, we define X = X 1 X 2 X 3 X 4 as follows: X 1 is uniform on b bits, X 2 is uniform on k 1 − ∆ − 3 bits, X 3 is the first (∆ + 6 − b, ∆ + 3 − b) source promised by Thm. 18 (for l = ∆ + 6 − b), and X 4 is constant
source promised by Thm. 18, and Y 4 is uniform on k 2 − ∆ − 3 bits. It is easily verified that H ∞ (X) ≥ k 1 and H ∞ (Y) ≥ k 2 . Finally, we set ρ XY to be the entangled (min(b 1 , b 2 ), min(b 1 , b 2 ) ) storage of the SMP protocol in Claim 16 allowing us to compute x 1 · y 1 exactly, and M the measurement strategy of the referee. Applying Thm. 18,
In the non-entangled case, we simply set b = min(b 1 , b 2 ) and replace the SMP protocol with a trivial protocol for IP on b bits. 11 In the superstrong case with entanglement, assume w.l.o.g. that b 1 > b 2 and choose b = b 1 /2. We then let ρ xy be the entangled state that appears in the superdense coding protocol for X 1 . Thus, exposing Bob's state allows us to compute X 1 · Y 1 exactly. Without entanglement, we set b = b 1 and have Alice send X 1 to Bob.
Many Bit Extractors
Here we prove our main Theorems 2 and 3. First, using our quantum XOR-Lemma 10, we obtain results in the strong case. 
The result then follows by Ineq. (5) in the proof of Cor. 14 and its non-entangled analogue.
In a similar way, we also obtain a Y-strong extractor with analogous parameters. Following [DEOR04] , we now apply a seeded extractor against quantum storage (see Def. 20) to the output of an X-strong (Ystrong) extractor to obtain a two-source extractor with more output bits (see Lem. 21). 
Definition 20 ([Ta-09]). A function
(entangled) quantum storage, and let E S : {0,
The result follows from the triangle inequality. For part (b) note that when the storage is non-entangled,
and it suffices to require that E S be a seeded extractor against only b 1 quantum storage.
A seeded extractor with almost optimal min-entropy loss is given in [DPVR09] . Their extractor is secure against guessing entropy sources, and so trivially against quantum storage [KT08] (see Sec. 5 for details). We reformulate the seeded extractor in terms of Def. 20. 
The proofs of Thms. 3 and 2 now follow by composing the explicit extractors of Lem. 19 and Cor. 22 as in Lem. 21. Proof of Theorem 3: E D is an X-strong extractor against entangled storage with 1 2 (k 1 + k 2 − 2b 2 − n − 2 log ε −1 ) almost uniform output bits. This is larger than O(log 3 (n/ε)) when k 1 + k 2 − 2b 2 > n + Ω(log 3 (n/ε)), allowing us to compose it with the seeded extractor secure against b 1 + b 2 storage of Cor. 22 on the source X, obtaining m =
Similarly, E D is a Y-strong extractor, and can be composed with the seeded extractor on the source Y. Choosing the better of the two, we prove the desired result. 12 Proof of Theorem 2: E D is an X-strong extractor against non-entangled storage with 1 2 (k 1 + k 2 − b 2 − n − 2 log ε −1 ) almost uniform output bits. This is larger than O(log 3 (n/ε)) when k 1 + k 2 − b 2 > n + Ω(log 3 (n/ε)). Composing with the seeded extractor secure against b 1 storage of Cor. 22 on the source
, and similarly for Y.
Guessing Entropy Adversaries
In previous sections, we considered extractors in the presence of quantum adversaries with limited storage. A stronger notion of quantum adversary was also studied in the literature [Ren05, KT08, FS08, DPVR09, TSSR10].
Definition 23 ([KT08]
). Let Xρ X be an arbitrary cq-state. The guessing entropy of X given ρ X is
where the maximum ranges over all POVMs M = {M x } x∈X .
Considering the probability distribution on the support of X induced by measuring with M on ρ X (which we denote by M(ρ X )), the above can be perhaps more easily understood as Renner [Ren05] considered sources with high relative min-entropy, rather than guessing entropy. The two were shown to be equivalent [KRS09] .
We can now define two-source extractors secure against non-entangled guessing entropy adversaries. Recall that in the non-entangled case the bounded storage is given by ρ X ⊗ ρ Y (see Def. 5). Here, we place a limit not on the amount of storage, but on the amount of information, in terms of guessing entropy, the adversaries have on their respective sources. That is, we require that the guessing entropy of X (Y) given ρ X (ρ Y ) be high. 
The extractor is called
It is called strong if it is both X-strong and Y-strong. 
Combining Eq. (7) with Eq. (8) gives
Finally,
as the left hand side describes a trivial strategy to guess f from M(ρ), giving the desired result.
A direct calculation shows that for every x, y, E (ρ x ⊗ ρ y ) = E 1 (ρ x ) ⊗ E 2 (ρ y ), where E 1 , E 2 are Pretty Good Measurements on states Xρ X , Yρ Y respectively. In other words, E (ρ X ⊗ ρ Y ) induces a classical distribution
where H g (X ← C X ) ≥ H g (X ← ρ X ), and the same for Y. By the definition of (classical) guessing entropy, one can easily show that a classical (k 1 , k 2 , ε) twosource extractor is a (k 1 + log ε −1 , k 2 + log ε −1 , 3ε) extractor against classical knowledge (for details see Proposition 1 in [KT08] ). Ineq. (9) then gives the desired parameters against quantum knowledge.
By a similar argument and following the proof of Theorem 1 in [KT08] , we get Corollary 28. If E is a classical one-bit output (k 1 , k 2 , ε) X-strong extractor, then it is a (k 1 , k 2 + log ε −1 , √ ε) X-strong extractor against quantum knowledge.
The multi-bit output case: We now show how to apply the results in the one-bit case, together with our XOR-Lemma 10, to show security in the multi-bit case, proving Thm. 4. By Ineq. (5) in the proof of Cor. 14, inner product is a classical X-strong extractor with error ε ≤ 2 −(k 1 +k 2 −n+2)/2 . Plugging this into Cor. 28 we obtain Corollary 29. The function E IP A (x, y) = Ax · y, for any full rank matrix A, is a (k 1 , k 2 , ε) X-strong (Y-strong) extractor against quantum knowledge provided that k 1 + k 2 ≥ n − 2 + 6 log ε −1 .
We now repeat the steps performed in Sec. 4 in the setting of non-entangled guessing entropy adversaries to obtain a multi-bit extractor against quantum knowledge. In exactly the same fashion as in the proof of Lem. 19 we use the XOR-Lemma 10 to reduce the security of E D to the strong one-bit case of Cor. 29.
Lemma 33 ([KT08, Lemma 5])
. Let E be a (k 1 , k 2 , ε) X-strong extractor. Then E is a (k 1 , k 2 + b 2 + log ε −1 , 4 · 2 3b 2 ε) X-strong extractor against (b 1 , b 2 ) non-entangled storage.
In particular, this shows that E D is an X-strong extractor with m = k 1 + k 2 − 10b 2 − n − 4 − 3 log ε −1 . For comparison, our Lem. 19 gives m = 1 2 (k 1 + k 2 − b 2 − n + 2 − 2 log ε −1 ), which is better when the storage is large, say, b 2 ≥ k 2 /19.
For completeness, we derive an alternate version of Thm. 2 based on Lem. 33, by composing the extractor above with the seeded extractor of [DPVR09] .
Theorem 34. The DEOR-construction is a (k 1 , k 2 , ε) extractor against (b 1 , b 2 ) non-entangled storage with m = (1 − o(1) ) max(k 1 − 9b 2 , k 2 − 9b 1 ) + k 1 − b 1 + k 2 − b 2 − n − 11 log ε −1 − O(1) output bits provided k 1 + k 2 − 10 max(b 1 , b 2 ) > n + Ω(log 3 (n/ε)).
Here too we are able to extract more bits than guaranteed by Thm. 2 when the storage is symmetric and constitutes a small fraction (< 1/19) of the min-entropy. In particular, the storage must be at least ten times smaller than the min-entropy, whereas no such restriction exist in Thm. 2.
We note that it is not immediately possible to obtain an analogue of Lem. 33 for weak two-source extractors. The proof relates the security of an extractor with respect to quantum side information, to its security with respect to classical side information. In the weak extractor setting, it thus suffices to consider classical side information of the form F (ρ X ⊗ ρ Y ) for some specific POVM F given in the proof. The problem with this approach is that generally F (ρ X ⊗ ρ Y ) might induce a random variable C XY correlated with both X and Y, breaking the independence assumption (i.e., when conditioning on values of C XY , X and Y might not be independent) and rendering the classical extractor insecure. It is not inconceivable that F does have the property F (ρ X ⊗ ρ Y ) = C X ⊗ C Y , but we leave this open.
